Opet plovouci kod

[Snail Instruments]

>Jednoduse - si predstavuju tak aby ho prumerne inteligentni clovek
>nerozlustil.

Rekl bych, ze zamenujete inteligenci se vzdelanim (mysleno v oboru
kryptologie). Pokud by nekdo zacinal lustit doopravdy 'na zelene louce',
tak samozrejme i jednoduchy kod ho bude stat znacne usili a zrejme se na to
vybodne. Muze se ovsem stat, ze clovek zbehly v oboru pusti pres noc
jednoduchy programek a cely ten Vas zazrak rozlouskne za pouziti hrube
sily, obzvlaste, pokud se bude jednat o samorostly algoritmus typu "prvni
XOR posledni AND prostredni".

A pak - nezapomente, ze na otevreni dveri sekyrkou uplne staci IQ 65.

>Myslim si ze bezpecnost je uz pomerne dobre zajistena tim ze pokud to
>pouziju v dalk. ovl., tak se na to kazdej vybodne aby prijimal kod  pak ho
>jeste musel nejak dekodovat.

J. Hanzal

P.S. Mam ulozeny docela hezky clanek, ale nevim, odkud jsem ho stahnul.
Tady je zacatek, snad bude stacit zadat par prvnich slov do nejakeho
vyhledavace:

>Tamper Resistance - a Cautionary Note
>
>Ross Anderson <rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk> 
>
>Cambridge University
>Computer Laboratory
>Pembroke Street
>Cambridge CB2 3QG
>England
>
>Markus Kuhn <kuhn@cs.purdue.edu> 
>
>COAST Laboratory
>Department of Computer Sciences
>Purdue University
>West Lafayette, IN 47907
>U.S.A.
>
>Abstract
>
>An increasing number of systems, from pay-TV to electronic purses, rely on
the tamper resistance of
>smartcards and other security processors. We describe a number of attacks
on such systems - some old,
>some new and some that are simply little known outside the chip testing
community. We conclude that
>trusting tamper resistance is problematic; smartcards are broken
routinely, and even a device that was
>described by a government signals agency as `the most secure processor
generally available' turns out to
>be vulnerable. Designers of secure systems should consider the
consequences with care. 
>
>This paper has been published by the USENIX Association in The Second
USENIX Workshop on Electronic
>Commerce Proceedings, Oakland, California, November 18-21, 1996, pp 1-11,
ISBN 1-880446-83-9.